The volatility of aggregate economic activity in the United States decreased markedly in the mid eighties. The decrease involved several components of GDP and has been linked to a more stable economic environment, identified by smaller shocks and more effective policy, and a diverse set of innovations in technology as well as financial markets. We study one such financial innovation, and document a negative relation between the rapid growth of mortgage-backed securities and the volatility of GDP and some of its components from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s. We also document that this relation changed sign, from negative to positive, in the early 2000s.
Introduction
The volatility of aggregate economic activity in the United States decreased in the mid eighties. The consensus date for a significant decrease, termed The Great Moderation by Stock and Watson (2002) , is the last quarter of 1984. Three broad reasons have been suggested to explain this phenomenon: a structural change in the economy, an improvement in the implementation of economic policy, especially monetary policy, and a lucky draw in the sequence of random shocks that affect the economy. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and can well interact with one another. A challenge has been to identify which channels of transmission from shocks to economic activity have been affected and how. Among the channels that have received much attention are monetary policy, technological change, especially inventory management, financial markets development, and international integration. Again, focusing on one aspect is dictated by convenience at some level; the idea that the decrease in volatility is diffuse across several components and therefore is not likely to be explained by one factor is clearly conveyed by Kim, Nelson and Piger (2004) and Stock and Watson (2002) , among others.
We study the link between a particular form of financial-market development, the process of securitization of mortgage debt, and real economic activity. There are several reasons to focus on such an aspect of the evolution of financial markets over the last thirty to forty years. First, mortgage backed securities (MBSs) were a small fraction of GDP in the late seventies, but have become enormous in present days, and the timing of the development of this market is consistent with the timing of the Great Moderation. By the early 2000s, about sixty percent of household mortgages had been securitized. Because household mortgage debt is almost the size of GDP, the mortgage-backed securities market grew from a relatively small fraction to over half of GDP in about twenty years. It is therefore important to document whether or not a statistical relation with aggregate real variables is detectable. Second, mortgage backed securities have a direct link to an important household decision, the purchase of a house, and lenders' decisions to finance the purchase. Thus, the evidence that we document points (indirectly) to the possibility that the availability of risk diversification through mortgage pools generated a smoother allocation of credit. This channel of transmission does not rely on or require that financial innovation be related to the quantity of credit available or to the relaxation of credit constraints. Third, mortgage backed securities allow for the diversification of different kinds of risks, in particular interest rate and prepayment risks, and credit risk. The credit risk or counterparty risk inherent in mortgage loans has been historically low, in part because of collateral and the fractional support of the house purchase, in part because the amount of counterparty risk is to a large extent under the control of the lender. Interest rate risk, on the other hand, is largely aggregate in nature, and not easily diversifiable by the lender. Diversification of interest and prepayment risks is, initially, the main purpose of the creation of pools. The observation that both credit risk and interest rate risk are pooled in mortgage backed securities is important, because potentially the introduction of these derivatives could lead to a decrease or an increase in the risks managed by intermediaries. For example, the diversification of prepayment risk could increase the amount of counterparty risk that they are willing to undertake. One of the hypothesis for which we find support is that in the aggregate mortgage backed securities were associated with a decrease in aggregate volatility until about 2000, but that in the last part of the sample the relation changed sign, and higher volatility is correlated with the expansion of mortgage securities markets. A corollary of this hypothesis is that even if financial market developments contributed to the Great Moderation, their contribution could have been temporary, to the point of not only fading away over time but also change direction.
We study the empirical relation between the volatility of economic activity and MBS markets between 1976 and 2011 using quarterly observations on GDP and some of its components, and quarterly observations on MBSs issued by government sponsored enterprises (GSE's) and private intermediaries. More specifically, we construct various measures of volatility for the growth rates of real GDP, consumption, housing consumption, residential investment, and investment in single housing, and then examine the empirical relation between real and financial variables with two statistical models: a linear autoregressive model and non-linear Markov switching model. The evidence is supportive of a negative relationship between the growth of mortgage-backed securities and the volatility of real activity in the first part of the sample, between the mid 1970s and 2000; in the second part of the sample the relationship is to some extent reversed, and volatility in real economic growth is positively related to changes in volume in MBS markets. Therefore, the empirical evidence highlights an important change in the relationship between MBS markets and the volatility of aggregate variables: in the late 1990s MBS markets become progressively associated with higher volatility. These results are robust to changes in the cost of credit, measured by the economy's rate of interest, and to other types of household credit securitization (auto, student, credit card, and other forms of revolving consumer credit).
The structure of the mortgage pools market was completely dominated by GSE's until the mid nineties. During that period private institutions entered the market with similarly structured pools of mortgages. The data set that we employ from the Flow of Funds distinguishes between GSE's pools and private conduits pools (henceforth, ABS pools). The potential difference between the two aggregates is the size of individual mortgages in the pool and the credit rating of borrowers to whom loans were issued. The timing of the beginning of the positive correlation between the MBS markets and aggregate volatility coincides with the emergence of ABS pools, raising the question of whether the change in the sign of the correlation is due to the introduction of ABS pools. Our results for GSE and ABS pools are very similar; as a consequence, our findings point to a general transformation of the industry rather than a difference between GSE pools and ABS pools. An attempt to understand the relationship between the historic evolution of MBSs and the transformation of the industry in the early 2000s, when several other loans besides mortgages were securitized (credit card, auto, student, etc.) is certainly an important question to investigate. It is not pursued here because we study the evolution of the MBS market starting in the mid seventies, whereas the development of securitization involving a variety of institutions and different classes of loans is a much more recent phenomenon.
This paper focuses on the empirical relation between MBS markets and real aggregate economic activity. We do not model the transition or mechanism that links microeconomic decisions to macroeconomic evidence, which is an extremely important question to address. An important step in studying the phenomena discussed in the preceding two paragraphs is to verify whether, or the extent to which, real and financial variables are statistically related at the aggregate level. The question that we address is whether the growth of a particular kind of financial market from relatively low capitalization to over two thirds of GDP is statistically visible in the correlations with relevant real variables at the aggregate level. At the end of the paper, we provide some discussion of the questions that arise in light of our results.
Related Literature
The Great Moderation was identified by a set of papers by Kim and Nelson (1999) 1 These papers document a break in volatility in the mid eighties, and attribute it to smaller shocks, 1 There is an earlier literature documenting the lower volatility of economic activity after second world war that is not the focus of our analysis -see for example Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) .
better implementation of monetary policy, and structural changes in the economy, especially related to technology and financial-market innovation. A particular aspect, for example stressed by Blanchard and Simon (2001) , and Bernanke (2004) , is the role played by a decrease in the variability of inflation during the Great Moderation, thus establishing a strong link between aggregate volatility monetary policy implementation. Financial-market development is discussed by Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006); although they do not consider a specific form of financial innovation, they conclude that financial market developments played an important role in the Great Moderation. Unlike these papers, which investigate several potential factors to explain the Great Moderation, Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) focus on a single factor. They analyze the role of inventories, and in particular the technological innovations that might have allowed for a structural change in inventory management. Blanchard and Simon (2001) already noted a reversion in the correlation between inventories and sales in the nineties; Kahn et al. (2002) go on to notice that part of the Great Moderation can be explained by a reduction in the variability in the production of durable goods, and that this reduction is not accompanied by a reduction in the volatility of sales of durable goods. A related paper, Ramey and Vine (2004) , however, points out that, at least for the case of the auto industry, the explanation of the decrease in industry-output volatility is due to a structural change of the sale process rather than technological changes in inventory or production management. We also consider a single structural change: we just focus on financial markets instead of durable goods markets.
There are two recent papers that are directly linked to our analysis. The first is Den Haan and Sterk (2010), which looks at a specific consequence of financial innovation, the reduction in credit constraints. Although they conclude that the alleviation of credit constraints does not seem to be correlated with reduction in volatility of real economic activity, Den Haan and Sterk (2010) find that the shift in the holders of the economy's mortgage debt, from banks to other institutions, does seem to play an important role. This shift of course was a consequence of the securitization process of mortgages. The second paper is Bezemer and Grydaki (2012) who show with a multivariate GARCH approach that lending, and mortgage lending in particular, played an important role in the Great Moderation. Finally, two papers analyze the role of investment. Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) point to investment as the main variable whose change can explain the moderation in the volatility of aggregate output. Peek and Wilcox (2006) , with a different methodology, consider residential investment and mortgage pools and find that securitization played an important role in the reduction of the volatility of residential investment. The important aspect of these results is that they highlight that it is essential to have a reduction of the volatility of investment to obtain a reduction in the volatility of output, and that this reduction can be brought about indirectly, and not necessarily through direct shocks.
Descriptive Statistics
We use five series from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) to measure the change in volatility of economic activity. These are quarterly observations on the seasonally adjusted annual growth rates of real gross domestic product, real personal consumption, real consumption of housing services, real residential investment, and real single family residential investment. The full sample under consideration goes from the first quarter of 1974 to the second quarter of 2011. 2 We employ personal housing consumption and investment in singlefamily homes in addition to aggregate variables because these variables correspond more closely to the financial derivatives that we consider. Specifically, we consider mortgagebacked securities issued by government-sponsored enterprises over the full sample period, and mortgage-backed securities issued by private conduits from the fourth quarter of 1984 to the end of our sample. Observations about mortgage pools come from the Flow of Funds of the United States. We consider only mortgage pools composed of single-family mortgages. This is by far the biggest component in the mortgage pools, much larger than multifamily and commercial pools (which are not held by government-sponsored enterprises) and it is the aggregate for which most consistent observations are available throughout the sample.
Mortgage debt was about 28 percent of GDP in 1974, and it has increased to about 68 percent in 2011 after a peak of about 78 percent in 2009. The increase in the weight of mortgage debt over GDP is mirrored by the emergence of mortgage pools. The fraction of mortgages pooled in mortgage-backed derivatives by GSE's out the total amount of (singlefamily) mortgage debt outstanding was slightly below 10 percent in 1974, to reach 56 percent in 2011. Mortgage pools issued by other financial institutions (i.e. not GSE's) constituted about 1 percent of all single-family mortgages in 1988, and the size of the market was negligible before then. By the end of the sample period this share had increased to 11 percent. Thus, the size of all mortgage-backed securities market went from practically negligible in the early seventies to well over two thirds of single-family mortgages in about thirty years. The main differences between mortgages in GSE's pools versus other pools concern size of the underlying loans and quality of the borrowers. GSE's are limited by regulation to create pools only with smaller mortgages (the current upper limit is $417,000 per mortgage loan) and to borrowers with high credit scores. Other institutions do not face these limits. Their pools, which we will refer to as asset backed securities (ABS's), are composed by mortgage loans that are characterized in the Flow of Funds as jumbo, sub-prime, or alt-A. The first label refer to the size of the loan, the second to the quality of the borrower and the third to loans that could in principle qualify for purchase by a GSE but because of some limitations not directly imputable to size and credit score, were not held by GSE's. Thus, at the level of the aggregate economy, the main difference between GSE's and non-GSE's mortgage pools is that the latter are designed to pool a potentially larger amount of credit risk. Both financial instruments reallocate interest rate risk.
Because of the explosive growth of MBS markets, we normalize its size and perform several stationarity tests on the resulting series. In particular, we normalize mortgage-backed Figure 1) ; second, we use the average house price as a normalizing variables. We obtain average single-family house prices from the Census Bureau. Essentially, the normalization of outstanding mortgage-backed securities with average house prices supplies a (rough) measure of the average number of houses for which the "insurance coverage" is provided by mortgage pooling.
For both GSE and ABS pools we employ normalizations by mortgage pools and house prices throughout the analysis.
For each of the five NIPA variables (real growth of GDP, personal consumption, consumption of housing services, residential investment, single-family residential investment) we construct four measures of volatility. One is commonly used in the literature and consists of the rolling standard deviation of a series using a twenty-quarter window (SD y,t ). This is the measure used, for example, by Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2002) . We then compute two realized volatility measures. Denote g y,t the growth rate of variable y; we first run the following regression
and then consider the absolute value of the residuals to compute realized volatilities
Here J indicates the number of lags of absolute residuals that are used in the computation of realized volatility; 4 we compute two measures of realized volatility for J = 10,and J = 20.
The final measure of volatility that we use is an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) specification:
where ⌦ t 1 represents the information available at time t 1 and ⌘ y,t = h y,t ✏ y,t , with ✏ y,t ⇠ N (0, 1). The first three volatility measures (SD y,t , RV It is also noticeable that volatility picks up, though at a reduced rate from a historic point of view, after 2000. Note that the pattern of GDP is repeated by the two residential investment measures employed, whereas consumption measure are historically much more stable, and show correspondingly a lower change in volatility both in 1984 and 2000 relative to GDP. It is also interesting to note the different magnitudes and variabilities of the volatility estimates. GDP volatility ranges between 1.4 and 7.2 percent across the different measures;
6 consumption volatility, for both consumption and consumption of housing services, is lower and ranges between 1.1 and 5.4 percent. Real residential investment and real investment in single housing exhibit a much higher variability (between 3 and 114 percent) indicating that the volatility of these variables is itself very volatile.
In the next section, we formally investigate the empirical relationships between the volatility of real variables and mortgage-backed securities. 
Empirical Analysis and Results
We analyze the relationship between the volatility of real variables and mortgage-backed securities with two empirical approaches. First, we estimate a linear model where we regress the different volatility measures of the real variables described above on mortgage-backed security variables (MBS and ABS). For these regressions, we divide the sample period into two sub-periods. For GSE's securities, the first sub-sample runs from 1974-Q1 to 2003-Q4 and the second from 1999-Q1 to 2011-Q2. For ABS's, the first sub-sample starts in 1984-Q4, as earlier the size of the market is negligible; the second sub-sample is the same as for the GSE's. The two sub-samples correspond respectively to a decline and to an increase in the volatility of the macro variables considered, and provide statistically stationary series.
7
In the first sub-period, we expect to find a negative relationship between real variables and mortgage-backed securities -i.e. MBS should display negative correlation with the volatility of real variables; in the second sub-period we expect mortgage-backed securities to be positively correlated with the volatility of real variables.
For the linear approach, we must consider periods for which the variables employed are stationary. 8 We, therefore, perform four stationarity tests, the generalized least squares Table 11 in the Appendix. Stationarity is often a philosophical issue more than a substantive one and it strongly depends on the selected sample. We consider a variable to be stationary -i.e. I(0) -if at least two out of the four tests indicate that the variable is stationary (either by rejecting the null of non-stationarity, as for the DF, ADF and PP tests, or by failing to reject the null of stationarity, as in the KPSS test). Our observations run over a relatively short time period. Therefore, we are generous with our critical values which we set at twenty percent level.
In a second approach, we consider a non-linear relationship and estimate a Markovswitching model in which we assume that there are two possible regimes: one in which real variables are characterized by high volatility and one in which real variables are characterized by low volatility. We first estimate transition probabilities assuming that they are constant. Then, we estimate the model allowing the transition probabilities to be time-varying functions of mortgage-backed securities. Stabilizing effects consist of increasing the probability of transitioning into the low-volatility state and/or decreasing the probability of leaving it. A change in transition probabilities with different sign would denote a destabilizing effect. We next describe the linear and non-linear models and discuss the estimation results.
Linear Model
We estimate the following equation for each variable that survives the stationarity tests:
where V ol y,t represents one of the volatilities: SD y,t (rolling standard deviation), RV y refers to the real variables: GDP, consumption, consumption of housing services, residential investment and investment in single housing; and x r,t n represents the nth-lag of the first difference of a measure of mortgage-backed securities outstanding, either issued by GSE's or private conduits (ABS's). We normalize GSE and ABS alternatively by the total single-family mortgage debt outstanding (GSEM and ABSM ) and by the average house price (GSEH and ABSH ). 10 We let the lag of the explanatory variable, measured in quarters, to be determined by best fit, so potentially this is different across different combinations of variables.
11
Tables 1 -5 display the results (missing estimated parameters indicate that at least one of the variable is not stationary).
12 Table 1 shows that, in the first sub-period , GSE is associated with a reduction in the volatility of GDP. ABS, in the second sub-period (1984 -2003) is also associated with low GDP volatility levels. In the third sub-period, both GSE and ABS are associated with high GDP volatility. These results are confirmed by Table 2 , which refers to the volatility of real consumption. In Tables 1 and 2 , the estimated parameters are strongly significant and have negative signs in the first two sub-periods and positive signs in the last sub-period. We interpret the difference in lag-length as a statistical artifact. In fact, we report results for the optimal lag. The results, however, hold for a range of lag-lengths.
13 Table 3 reports the results for the volatility of Real Consumption of Housing Services. In subperiods one and two, GSE and ABS are associated with lower volatility levels. In the third sub-period, however, ABS is associated with a higher level of volatility, as expected, whereas GSE is associated with lower volatility. Although this result may seem counter intuitive, it can be explained by the behavior of housing consumption. In fact, how we shall see in the next sub-section, low activity in the housing market is concentrated during recessions and, consequently, the volatility of housing consumption behaves inversely with respect to the volatility of the other real variables we consider. Table 4 shows estimation results for the volatility of Real Residential Investment. GSE is always associated with low volatility, while ABS is only marginally significant. Finally, Table 5 shows estimation results for the volatility of Single-Housing Investment. GSE and ABS are associated with low volatility in the first two sub-periods and and with an increase in volatility in the last sub-period. Overall, our linear estimates confirm that MBS and volatility of real variables are negatively correlated in the first two sub-periods and positively correlated in the latest period when the recent sub-prime crisis hit the economy. We also performed the same estimates using the real mortgage interest rate as a control variable, and found that it was never statistically significant. The purpose of controlling for the interest rate was to verify whether MBS pools are a proxy for "cheap" credit. However, the cost of credit does not have explanatory power of real volatility in addition to the evolution of the MBS market. We also controlled for other forms of consumer credit: auto loans, credit card debt, consumer loans of banks, and student loans. None of these aggregates, in conjunction with the interest rate or not, is statistically significant in explaining real volatility.
14 These loans constitute an important component of the process of securitization, but the securitization of these kinds of loans is a phenomenon that begins in the late 1990s and has a smaller scale than the securitization of mortgages. The change in sign that we document in our regressions does not point at a difference between GSE pools and ABS pools, and might be related to a broader evolution in the securitization market, from a specialized market where a single contract was traded to a market where a wide variety of institutions securitized a broad variety of loans. We do not address this issue, which is pertinent to financial market dynamics between the mid 1990s and early 2000s, but it is a natural question that arises from the analysis and it will be important to address.
Non-Linear Model
We now take a different approach, and instead of imposing the presence of different subperiods we estimate a regime-switching model over the entire sample. The assumption in this case is that the process described by the dependent variable can shift between two regimes, one of high and one of low volatility, and that the process followed by the two regimes evolves according to a two-state first-order Markov process. The advantage of this approach is that, unlike the previous case, we need not be concerned with stationarity issues and do not have to partition exogenously the whole sample period in sub-samples. The disadvantage is that we have to estimate a much larger number of parameters. The specific equation that we estimate is given by g y,t = µ i,y + ✏ y,t .
14 We do not report these results for brevity, but they are of curse available upon request from the authors. 
where is the standard normal distribution. Here z t = a + bx r,t n + t where the error term t is normally distributed and orthogonal to ✏ y,t . The meaning of the explanatory variable x r,t n is the same discussed in the previous section: it represents the nth-lag of a measure of mortgage-backed securities outstanding, either issued by GSE's or private conduits (GSEM, GSEH, ABSM and ABSH ), and the lag is determined optimally by best fit. Estimation is by maximum likelihood using the EM algorithm by Hamilton (1994) . Tables 6-10 show the results. The first column of each table reports estimation results for the model with constant transition probabilities. Table 6 refers to GDP estimates. The highvolatility state ( 0 = 5.022) is characterized by a low growth rate, whereas the low-volatility state ( 1 = 1.683) is characterized by a higher growth rate. The low-volatility regime is more persistent than the high-volatility regime. 15 The graphs of the transition probabilities are reported in the Appendix. When we introduce explanatory variables in the transition probabilities, we allow those probabilities to change over time. GSE's securities, both as a fraction of total mortgage lending and normalized by house prices, have a significant negative coefficient in the p (s t = 0 | s t 1 = 0), i.e. the probability of remaining in the high-volatility state is lower when securitized mortgages are considered. The opposite result holds for ABS normalized by mortgage debt outstanding. As expected, Log-likelihood values improve when we introduce an additional explanatory variable in the transition probabilities. Table  7 reports results for real consumption. In this case the low-volatility state is much more persistent (see Figure 9 ). Similarly to the GDP results, the probability of remaining in the low-volatility state increases with GSE's securities, and decreases with ABS. Table 8 refers to consumption of housing services. Contrary to the other models, the high-volatility regime ( 0 = 2.445) is characterized by high growth (µ 0 = 2.926), whereas the low-volatility regime ( 1 = 1.278) is accompanied by a low growth rate (µ 1 = 0.754). A possible reason is that low activity in the housing market is concentrated during recessions (see Figure 10 in the Appendix). GSE's increase the probability of staying in the state with high growth while ABS reduce that probability. Interestingly, GSE's also increase the probability of remaining in the low-volatility state. Tables 9 and 10 concern respectively residential investment and investment in single housing, which are among of the most volatile aggregates in the National GSEH (2) GSEM (4) ABSH (4) Table 6 : Estimation results: regime-switching model, Real GDP.
Income Accounts. For both aggregates results are consistent: the introduction of mortgage backed securities issued by GSE's tends to decrease the probability of remaining in the highvolatility state and increase the probability of leaving the high volatility state, whereas the opposite is true for securities issued by private conduits. An important remark refers to the combined evidence from the linear and non-linear models. As the sign change the coefficient relating mortgage backed securities and real variables tends to be positive in the second sub-sample for all issuing institutions, it is likely that the different sign in the non-linear model between GSE's and private conduits is due to different samples: all signs tend to be positive over the period 1999-2011 in the linear model and private conduits become a relevant fraction of the market only in the late 1990s. The same phenomenon could be behind the different levels of statistical significance between GSE securities and private issuers. As in the case of the linear model, estimates are broadly consistent across models. (Time lags are also in line between the linear and non-linear specifications.) Moreover, again like in the linear model, estimates pertaining to ABS markets tend to be statistically weaker due to the smaller sample. (8) 
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Conclusions
We showed evidence of a persistent statistical link between the volatility of certain real economic aggregates and financial instruments that directly derive from mortgage lending decisions. The intent of our approach was to "let the data speak" to verify the robustness of this link. Our results also raise several questions. First, about the economic nature of the statistical relation between financial markets and the real economy, and second about potential determinants of the change in this relation, represented by the change in the sign of the coefficients at the end of the 1990s. Securitization is a process that can influence both risk taking and lending activity. The economic channels of transmission must thus connect the redistribution of risk with the market for credit, and in turn the market for credit with investment expenditure (in this case, construction) and consumption. The study of these channels of transmission from financial markets to the real economy requires a detailed analysis of households and financial intermediaries decision-making process and their empirical implications. By its nature this analysis is theoretical as well as empirical, and requires a different framework of analysis from the one employed in the present study. These open issues constitute a fertile ground for research.
Appendix
This appendix presents tables with summary statistics, the results of the stationarity tests, and the graphs of the (exogenous) transition probabilities estimates from the Markov switching model. For the KPSS the null is that the variable is stationary -I(0). † means rejection of the I(1) null for DF, ADF and PP at least at the 20% level, and failure to reject the null of I(0) for KPSS at least at the 1% level. 
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